Lawmaking in Authoritarian Regimes: Spain and Argentina in Comparative Perspective

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ABSTRACT
The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential for lawmaking because dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. However, the comparative evidence available shows there is significant variation in the outcomes of lawmaking activity. Based on the premise that once legislative institutions are set up as centerpieces of power-sharing arrangements they become costly for dictators to ignore, and are consequently likely to affect both the lawmaking process and its outcomes, we propose that the extent to which legislatures are central to such arrangements is contingent on how each regime designs its power-sharing. We test this argument by comparing the performance of the Cortes under Franco’s regime in Spain and the Legislative Advisory Commission (CAL) under Argentina’s last military dictatorship, two cases for which significant information is available and with contrasting differences in both the dependent and independent variables. The comparison suggests that legislatures in authoritarian regimes can be consequential for lawmaking when the power-sharing arrangements within which they are incepted establish collective Executives that require lawmaking processes apt to enable different factions to revise and amend legislative initiatives.

KEYWORDS
Authoritarian regimes- Legislatures- Cortes- CAL

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Are legislatures in authoritarian regimes irrelevant or consequential for lawmaking? The literature on institutions under authoritarianism typically describes the role of legislatures as the provision of a forum for coalition partners to voice their demands and bargain about policy, but subjects the effectiveness of bargaining to the sovereign decision of the dictator. So however representative the legislature may be, however lively their debates may appear, the ultimate legislative decisions remain in the dictator's hands, thus making the legislature irrelevant for lawmaking. However, when the actual cases are observed, there is significant variation in the outcomes of lawmaking activity among legislatures in authoritarian regimes. While the Supreme Soviet in the USSR never rejected a government bill (White 1980), scholars have found significant amendment activity in the Polish Sejm between 1952 and 1972 (Olson and Simon 1982), the Kenyan House of Representatives in the 1960s (Gertzel 1966), the Thai parliament in the 1960s and 70s (Mezey 1979), as well as notable rejection rates of 13% in Jordan between 1964 and 1974 (Mezey 1979), and 30% in Kenya in the early 1970s (Loewenberg and Patterson 1979). Moreover, Saiegh (2011: 82) himself, studying fourteen authoritarian regimes in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe between 1965 and 1999, calculated an 8% average rejection rate, with ranges between a maximum of 26.77% for Kuwait and minimum of zero for Brazil. This variation points to a more consequential role for legislatures in lawmaking.

Explaining this variation on a cross-time, cross-country basis is next to impossible. Floor and committee voting records are so scarce there is no way to build a representative sample for any dependent variable; and the information available on legislatures' internal rules and the sociological backgrounds and political careers of legislators is so little that no representative time series of independent variables can be constructed. The alternative is therefore to approach the issue by building theory and testing it on a small-N comparison, in the hope that as more information is acquired in the future, the theory can be tested in more cases. This is the approach adopted in this paper.

The theory we propose is based on the premise that once legislative institutions are set up as centerpieces of power-sharing arrangements within authoritarian regimes, they become costly for dictators to ignore, and are consequently likely to affect both the lawmaking process and its outcomes. The extent to which legislatures are central to such arrangements is contingent on how each regime designs its power-sharing. Regimes concentrating executive power in one person generally intend to limit their power-sharing
commitment to providing voice to coalition members, so they would typically either organize legislatures with little to no agenda and/or policymaking powers, or no legislature at all. In contrast, regimes distributing executive power within a collective body generally intend to share power in a more extensive way, so they would typically organize legislatures with comparatively stronger agenda and/or policymaking powers. The former type of legislature, which we label as notary, typically approves every bill sent by the Executive and has no input in the substance of lawmaking; whereas the latter type, which we label as reviser, typically rejects and amends many bills, thus limiting the Executive's lawmaking power and influencing the substance of legislation.

The cases selected to put this theory to the test are those of the Cortes under Franco's regime in Spain and the Legislative Advisory Commission (CAL) under Argentina's last military dictatorship. These cases were selected on the basis of three criteria. Two concern the variation in both the dependent and independent variables. As for the dependent variables, the Cortes never rejected a government bill, while the CAL rejected 18% of the Executive proposals. And as for the independent variables, the Cortes were incepted within a personal dictatorship in which the dictator maintained lawmaking power in his hands, while the CAL was instituted within a collective dictatorship in which no president was ever capable of making any unilateral decision whatsoever. The third one, in turn, is information availability: they are both among the very few cases for which complete information on both the makeup of the legislature and the outcome of its activities is actually available.

The paper is structured as follows. The first section reviews the theory on legislatures under authoritarianism. The second section proposes a theory to explain the variation in lawmaking outcomes on the basis of the variation in institutional design. The third section compares the institutional design of the Cortes and the CAL, and proposes the hypotheses on lawmaking outcomes to be tested on the basis of archival data. The fourth section tests the hypotheses and discusses the results. The final section concludes.

1. Legislatures under Authoritarianism: Irrelevant or Consequential?

The "new institutionalism in the study of authoritarian regimes" (Schedler 2009) has expanded the field of research about authoritarianism to encompass legislatures. This body of research has hitherto focused on explaining the rationale for the inception of
legislatures and their role in the political economy of authoritarianism. But the theories proposed so far have paid scant attention to the institutional design of legislatures as dependent or independent variables. Consequently, while these theories may explain the origin and functions of legislatures and shed light on how their institutions help them fulfill those functions, they do not account for the specificity of their institutional design or their effects on lawmaking outcomes.

Legislatures in authoritarian regimes have been explained as commitment devices to limit authoritarian government. Building on the seminal work of North and Weingast (1989) about the role of constitutions in committing absolute rulers to respect property rights, Haber et al. (2003) argued that rules could credibly commit authoritarians to respect such rights if a third party enforcer existed whose cooperation was required for government survival. Boix (2003) propped up this argument by documenting that authoritarian regimes which included them were less prone to confiscate rents. Escribá Folch (2003, 2005) modeled the creation of legislatures as contingent on the share of mobile capital in the economy and the dictator's discount factor.

The role of legislatures in authoritarian polities has been depicted as that of committing dictators to respect power-sharing arrangements. Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) claimed that while authoritarian rulers typically employ consultative councils, juntas, and political bureaus to defuse threats from rivals within the ruling elite, they need to use legislatures if their survival requires neutralizing threats and soliciting cooperation from other groups in society. Legislatures are the arenas where rulers enhance their bases of support by negotiating policy concessions with political and societal actors that take into account their demands, and thus raise their stakes on the regime's survival (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007: 1283). Boix and Svolik (2013) argued that when the distribution of power within the ruling coalition is balanced – i.e. when the dictator's allies can make credible threats of rebellion – dictators have incentives to establish and maintain legislatures that institutionalize power-sharing arrangements. Legislatures thus strengthen commitments to respect those arrangements by preventing both dictators' misrepresentation of the size of benefits to be distributed and their refusal to share them (Boix and Svolik 2013: 306-07).

However, the literature on legislatures in authoritarian regimes has paid scant attention to their institutional design and its effects on lawmaking processes and outcomes. Some
authors have proposed typologies of legislatures: Gandhi et al. (2003) distinguished between rubber-stamp legislatures with no significant policymaking powers and strong legislatures that operate as forums for meaningful bargaining; and Wright (2008) distinguished between binding legislatures, that credibly constrain the power of authoritarian rulers, and nonbinding legislatures that fail to do so. Nevertheless, none specified the institutional features underpinning those distinctions, nor explained how strong or binding legislatures would actually constrain the power of authoritarian rulers.

Other authors, focusing on cases studies, showed that certain political institutions could strengthen the power of legislatures. Malesky and Schuler (2010) studied how nomination procedures, electoral competitiveness, and professionalism shaped delegates' behavior in the Vietnam National Assembly by subjecting them to multiple principals and competitive incentives, and empowering them to scrutinize government actions; and Truex (2014) explored how "consultative authoritarianism", as defined by He and Warren (2011) affected regime support in China with its public participation channels. But while these works indicate that electoral systems and societal linkages provide legislatures with tools to hold rules accountable to some degree, none studied how legislative institutions shaped and limited dictators' lawmaking powers.

The sole exception to these patterns we have identified is Desposato's (2001) work on legislative politics in authoritarian Brazil. This paper modeled legislative behavior during the 1964-1985 military regime arguing that under strategic and career-seeking assumptions, legislators were more likely to vote against the government when the military had little political room to purge them and their negative vote could strengthen their position among voters and party elites (Desposato 2001: 289-93). Desposato's model implied that for legislatures to perform as arenas for significant policy bargaining the Executive must somehow be restrained in its ability to override legislators’ decisions; and that for legislatures to work as venues for integrating societal and political actors, there must be effective guarantees for their electoral, agenda-setting, and policymaking powers. With the exception of this piece, there are virtually no studies that theorize how the institutional design of legislatures may be consequential for lawmaking under authoritarianism, nor identify the potentially consequential institutions or explain their efficacy.
A possible explanation for this slight attention to institutional design is the assumption that dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. If authoritarian rulers could solve conflicts with legislators by closing the legislature or purging its members, any separation of powers or constraint on dictatorial government could be authoritatively dissolved. This would explain why authoritarian Executives dominate policymaking and government defeats on legislative votes are infrequent even when legislatures are institutionally strong (Gandhi et al. 2003).

We challenge this assumption for two reasons. First, for institutions to serve their purpose they must credibly commit actors to respect them by imposing costs for violating them. So if, as Boix and Svolik (2013) contend, authoritarian rulers create and maintain legislatures to defuse threats of rebellion by their allies, then in order to credibly commit themselves to respect power-sharing arrangements dictators would need to design legislatures that effectively influence lawmaking. Second, if legislative institutions matter for sustaining power-sharing arrangements, then their design matters because it shapes the extent of their lawmaking powers and their influence on legislative outcomes. In other words, if legislatures are established within power-sharing arrangements in authoritarian regimes, then they matter for lawmaking and its outcomes; and they matter in the specific ways set up by their institutional design. This is the basis for our theory in the next section.

2. Lawmaking under Authoritarianism: from Notary to Reviser Legislatures.

A theory of lawmaking under authoritarianism must answer three main questions: Under what conditions would dictators establish legislatures that assume a central role in power-sharing and policymaking? What specific legislative institutions make legislatures effective for those purposes? What are the effects of those institutions on lawmaking processes and outcomes?

The answer to the first question, as suggested by the literature on limited authoritarian government, depends on the nature of power-sharing arrangements. All dictators must establish some power-sharing device to commit their ruling coalition to loyalty by credibly limiting the leadership's potential for abuse so that coalition members "vest their interest in the survival of the dictatorship" (Magaloni 2008: 721). But different power-sharing devices entail different levels of commitment. When regimes concentrate executive power in one person, they generally intend for power-sharing to be highly
limited – specifically, no further than to giving voice to coalition members. To help them manage such limited power-sharing, dictators would establish legislatures with little to no agenda and/or policymaking powers. When regimes distribute executive power within a collective body, they generally intend for power-sharing to be more extensive – likely to involve coalition members in both policymaking and succession processes. To manage this more complex power-sharing, dictators would establish legislatures with comparatively significant agenda and/or policymaking powers.

The answer to the second and third questions, as suggested by the theories of legislative organization in democratic polities, depends on the specific institutions that establish the division of legislative power between the Executive and the legislature, the design of the Executive branch, and the distribution of agenda power within the legislature. For dictators to credibly commit themselves to honor power-sharing arrangements that grant their allies effective input in policymaking they need to divide legislative power between the Executive and the legislature. This may be accomplished in many ways, as shown by Shugart and Carey (1992), Carey and Shugart (1998), and Shugart and Haggard (2001), depending on the scope of presidential veto, decree and agenda powers, and the legislature's amendment and override capacities. When the rules give decree power to the Executive and confer the ability to elude consent from the legislature, authoritarian rules can make laws alone; but when they divide legislative power by granting legislatures necessary participation to make such decisions and capacity to uphold them, authoritarian Executives – just like their democratic counterparts – cannot operate as absolute sovereigns who make law on their own.

The institutional design of the Executive branch in authoritarian regimes determines the ability of dictators to make unilateral decisions about the rules and workings of the political regime. While a personal Executive can operate the regime as an extension of the ruler's political will, a collective Executive typically precludes any individual or faction monopolizing political power and forces dictators to rule in coalition. Occasionally, some skilled political manipulator may transform a collective dictatorship into a personal one, as Stalin did in the Soviet Union, but often – as Barros (2005) demonstrated for Pinochet's case in Chile – as the balance of power institutionalizes a collective Executives these bodies can prevent personal rule and constrain the leader's ability to make unilateral decisions. Thus, just like in democracies, when the rules of authoritarian regimes design the Executive as a collective organization where no
individual or faction may monopolize power, leaders must form and maintain coalitions to govern, and pay for those coalitions by negotiating policy concessions.

The distribution of agenda power within the legislature impacts the ability of factions or parties to shape the lawmaking process and its outcomes. For dictators to credibly commit to provide a forum for cooperation, bargaining and binding decision-making, they must endow the actors whose cooperation they solicit with agenda power. This power can be distributed in many ways, as argued by the theories of legislative organization. Agenda setting may be monopolized by committees made up of self-selected legislators with homogeneous preferences, thus leading to an industrial organization of pork-barrel politics based upon universal vote trading under closed deliberation rules (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988). Or agenda power may be shared by plenary floors and committees made up of legislators with heterogeneous preferences, thus leading to open rule deliberation under informational contents that prevent capture of lawmaking by special interests and satisfy legislators' desire to contemplate the potential consequences of their decisions (Krehbiel 1992). Or, alternatively, agenda power may be concentrated in the Executive (Cox and Morgenstern 2002) or the political authorities of the legislature, and exercised strictly to maintain the majority party or cartel in control, thus leading to the sole approval of the legislation palatable to such cartel (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007). Thus, just like in democracies, when the rules of authoritarian regimes grant agenda power to the ruling coalition, as predicted by cartel theory, then governments make the laws they want and both delays and defeats are highly unlikely. But when agenda power is given to different factions or parties in formats equivalent to those modeled by distributive and informational theories of legislative organization, then unilateral legislative decisions by authoritarian leaders are precluded and the lawmaking process is likely to produce obstruction and amendments to legislative initiatives.

The combination of these literatures on limited authoritarian government and legislative organization thus suggest that the less personalized and more prone to power-sharing the dictatorship, the more empowered the legislature. Consequently, legislatures in authoritarian regimes may be located in a continuum between two extreme categories. On the one hand, regimes ruled by a personal Executive, typically interested in low levels of power-sharing, would incept – if at all – legislatures with scarce constitutionally required involvement in lawmaking, agenda power centralized in the Executive or its agents, and
little to no autonomous policymaking power. These legislatures, which we label as *notary*, would regularly approve whatever the Executive sends their way, typically without amendments. On the other hand, regimes ruled by a collective Executive, typically interested in higher levels of power-sharing, would incept legislative bodies with constitutionally required participation in lawmaking, comparatively decentralized agenda power shared between its members and the Executive, and somewhat autonomous policymaking power. These legislatures, which we label as *reviser*, would typically revise most of the Executive's legislative initiatives, approve the majority, but also reject and/or amend a significant share. Legislatures may change their position in this continuum as the nature of the regime's Executive and/or power-sharing arrangements changes.

To study the effects of legislative organization on the performance of legislatures in authoritarian regimes on a cross-national basis is next to impossible. Not only it is extremely difficult to obtain data on committee and floor voting in authoritarian polities to assess the dependent variable, but it is also hard to get hold of legislatures' internal regulations and committee assignments in order to assess important independent variables. In the face of such limitations, we chose the alternative strategy of comparing two most-different cases for which complete archives of rules and lawmaking processes are available: the Spanish *Cortes* under the Franco regime, and the Legislative Advisory Commission (CAL) run by the military regime in Argentina between 1976 and 1983.

The Spanish *Cortes* are a case of a notary legislature. They were incepted within a personal dictatorship in which the chief of state had – and maintained to his dying day – unilateral lawmaking powers. They were designed as a forum for the regime's "political families" to voice their opinion on Executive initiatives, but their agenda power was centralized in the *Cortes* presidency and tightly controlled by the government. Consequently, the *Cortes* never rejected a government bill in their entire history. In contrast, the Argentine CAL is a case of a reviser legislature. It was established by a collective dictatorship in which neither the President nor any individual member of the Military Junta had the ability to make any unilateral lawmaking decision, and was staffed with military officers who enjoyed some degree of autonomy by playing off the Junta Commanders and the factional leaders against each other. Though nominally a consultative body rather than a lawmaking assembly, the CAL’s intervention was required for any legislative initiative to be enacted, agenda power was decentralized to sub-commissions within the Commission, and all bills were debated under open rule.
Consequently, a significant number of Executive bills were amended and rejected. The contrast between these cases thus allows us to shed light on how different designs of legislative institutions yield different lawmaking processes and outcomes even under authoritarian regimes.

The next section compares the institutional design of the Cortes and the CAL in order to support the claim that the former was a notary legislature while the latter was of the reviser type. The following section illustrates the effects of these different institutional designs by focusing on lawmaking processes and their outcomes.


Following the theoretical argument outlined above, this section begins by describing the structure of the Executive in each authoritarian regime, and then proceeds to compare legislative institutions therein, in order to show their consistency with the power-sharing arrangements across branches.

The Executive: Personal versus Collective.

The regime led by Francisco Franco in Spain between 1936 and 1975 established a personal Executive in which the dictator, labeled Caudillo, enjoyed unilateral lawmaking power, with only a few belated restrictions, until his dying day. This power has been described as that of a "constituent dictator" who created a series of advisory bodies from which he sought counsel "but without the concentration of power in his benefit ever being the object of any sort of rectification" (Giménez Martínez 2014: 185-86). Between October 1936, when he took over as Chief of State, and January 1938, when he enacted the State's Central Administration Law (LACE), Franco ruled alone, with the sole assistance of the State's Technical Junta. For a brief period between February 1938 and August 1939, when the Central Administration Reorganization Law was passed, the enactment of the Caudillo's legislative initiatives had to be preceded by proposals from the ministries and deliberation in the Council of Ministers. Thereafter, Franco was able to enact by himself any legislation he saw fit, with the only requirement that amendments
to the state's constitutional laws – but not entirely new such laws – be heard before by the Council of the Realm (Giménez Martínez 2014).

The dictator was not only the sovereign legislator but also the master of both his cabinet and all the other advisory bodies created to provide him with legal, political or technical counsel. Franco exercised simultaneously as Chief of State and Chief of Government until June 1973, and as such he presided over the Council of Ministers, appointed and dismissed all its members at will, and his approval was required for any decision made within the Council. Throughout his tenure, the Caudillo was careful to balance the distribution of cabinet positions among the regime's support coalition. Although the Falange faction predominated between 1938 and 1945, the Catholics ascended between 1945 and 1957, and the technocrats rose thereafter (Giménez Martínez 2014: 249), all the regime's "political families" had seats in all of Franco's thirteen governments: the Falangist, the Catholic, the Traditionalist, the Monarchist and the technocrats (Fusi 1985: 92). Keeping representatives from all families in enabled the dictator to reassign seat shares whenever he sensed conflict looming among the factions, and thus maintain strict control over the cabinet (Fusi 1985: 91; Payne and Palacios 2014).

This pattern and practice of political balance was also applied to the other advisory bodies. The Council of the Realm, tasked with advising the Chief of State in case of war, disagreement with the Cortes on legislation, and the appointment of a successor, was chaired by the President of the Cortes, and made up of the highest Catholic priest, the most senior Captain General in the Army, the chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, the chairman of the State Council, the Supreme Tribunal and the Institute of Spain, alongside four counselors voted by the Cortes to represent each political faction, and three to represent the Chief of State; all of whom, with the exception of the priest, were appointed directly or indirectly by Franco (Giménez Martínez 2014: 412-13). The dictator also appointed all members of the State Council, tasked with analyzing legislative bills, except for the Prime Catholic Cardinal (Giménez Martínez 2014: 416-17). The only area of the administration in which one faction consistently held the majority of positions were the provincial governments, where Falange predominated throughout the regime; but Franco still appointed and dismissed governors by decree with the sole requirement of previous deliberation by the Council of Ministers, which he also appointed unilaterally in its entirety (Giménez Martínez 2014: 403-04).
These institutional arrangements, as theorized by Boix and Svolik (2013), were aimed at containing the factions that constituted the regime's support coalition in a way that not only did not threaten but actually reinforced Franco's personal rule. At the core of the Executive branch in his regime was a collective body, the Council of Ministers, but the dictator operated it as an administrative and consultative board designed to implement and legitimize his personal policy orientations. Franco allowed his ministers ample autonomy to run their departments and develop legislative and administrative initiatives (Fusi 1985: 91; Payne and Palacios 2014: 365; Tusell 1988: 216), and preferred to deal with them in bilateral meetings, rather than collective gatherings. The Council was therefore used by the Caudillo to elicit support from the different factions to the policies he had already discussed with each minister (Giménez Martínez 2014: 232). For this purpose, the Chief of State could determine whether Council agreements required majority or unanimity (Giménez Martínez 2014: 226), but whenever conflict and discussion among ministers proved protracted, Franco terminated debate by adopting a final decision that invariably "generated unwavering obedience" to his will (Giménez Martínez 2014: 233). These management practices prevented the emergence of any semblance of collective government and secured Franco's personal rule over the administration.

In contrast, the military government that ruled Argentina between 1976 and 1983 established a collective Executive branch that shared legislative power with the Legislative Advisory Commission. The collective Executive consisted of the Military Junta (JM) and the President. The JM was made up by the Commanders in Chief of the three Armed Forces – Army, Navy, and Air Force (“Estatuto del Proceso de Reorganización Nacional”: Article 1). The Junta appointed and removed the President (“Estatuto”: Articles 2 and 3) by unanimity rule (“Reglamento para el Funcionamiento de la Junta Militar, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional y Comisión de Asesoramiento Legislativo”: Articles 2.1 and 2.2).

The President and the Junta divided and shared executive power: the latter appropriated the powers to declare states of emergency and war, and to promote military officers; both shared the powers to appoint Supreme Court justices and provincial governors; and the President kept all remaining powers previously attributed by the Constitution to civilian
presidents ("Estatuto": Articles 2, 4, 5, 9 and 12). To make decisions, the Junta operated under two rules: full attendance of its membership, so no two Commanders could decide without the third; and majority voting, except to appoint or remove the President and to change the regime’s constitutional rules ("Estatuto": Articles 3 and 15). Cabinet positions in the Executive branch, as well as provincial governorships and municipalities, were divided up in three – granting roughly one third of positions to each of the Armed Forces (Novaro and Palermo 2006; Quiroga 1994).

Also consistently with Boix and Svolik’s (2013) prediction, this power-sharing arrangement was devised to institutionalize the balance of power within the ruling elite, though here in a way that protected collective dictatorship from the possibility of personal rule. The military sought to avoid repeating the experience of the 1966-73 dictatorship, in which the Army had practically monopolized decision-making and mostly kept the Navy and the Air Force out of the loop. The Army wanted to share the burden of the struggle against guerrillas; the Navy and the Air Force wanted to prevent the emergence of an Army strongman that could exclude them from decision-making (Novaro and Palermo 2006).

As in Franco's regime, the Argentine power-sharing arrangement was also meant to contain factionalism, but in a way that prevented any and all factions from achieving dominance. The Argentine Armed Forces were divided along many fault lines: the extent and timing of political repression, which pitted softliners against hardliners; the conduct of economic policy, which pitted neoliberals against developmentalists; and the breadth and speed of political transition, which pitted authoritarian reformers against transition advocates (Novaro and Palermo 2006). By making the JM the “supreme government entity” of the country, employing unanimity rule to appoint and remove the President, and equally sharing policymaking positions throughout all levels of government, all three Armed Forces were equally responsible for decision-making, and agreement among the three Commanders in Chief was a requisite for the regime to operate. To reach the presidency and coordinate the Executive branch, any military leader was forced to build coalitions not only within his service but also with the others – so as long as the fault lines dividing the military leadership were not bridged or eliminated, no strongman could emerge.
The institutional design of the Executive branches in these two authoritarian regimes had three theoretically relevant implications for our argument. First, while in Franco's regime unilateral decision-making was the rule for decades and an ever present possibility until the dictator's death, in the Argentine regime no unilateral Executive decisions were possible: whereas Franco could enact any legislative change by decree, no Argentine Junta member could decide anything alone; whereas Franco was able to directly appoint almost any official in the national and provincial governments, no Argentine President could appoint any Executive or judiciary officer without agreement from the Junta, or decide any administrative matter without Junta consent; whereas Franco could exercise his constituent power to create new organic legislation to structure his own regime, no Argentine Junta member or President could unilaterally change the rules of the regime.

Second, while Franco was Chief of State, supreme commander of the Armed Forces, and master of his regime until his dying day, in Argentina all Chief Executives were minority presidents: they belonged to only one service, the Army, and most likely to one – not necessarily dominant – faction within it, so it was impossible for them to command a majority in the Junta and unlikely for them to do so within their own ranks.

Third, while in Franco's Spain all governments were entirely appointed by Franco and made up of personally loyal ministers, in Argentina all governments had to be coalitional in nature: the tripartite division of cabinet positions made all cabinets coalitional; the division of Executive power forced presidents to form coalitions in the Junta to make decisions. In short, while in Spain the personal Executive structure generated and maintained the rule of one man who could decide unilaterally on virtually any matter, in Argentina the collective Executive structure produced minority presidents without unilateral decision-making powers forced to build and maintain coalition governments.

*The Legislature: Notary versus Reviser.*

The Cortes incepted in Spain in 1942 were designed as a forum for the political representation of the regime's factions that would neither legislate nor control the government or effectively operate independently from the Executive (Giménez Martínez 2014: 256). To guarantee Franco's control, the “Cortes Law” established that the legislature would consist of seven groups: the political group, constituted by the members
of the Falange National Council; the union group, made up from representatives of the Spanish Syndical Organization (OSE), the only officially sanctioned union in Spain during the regime; the local group, selected from provincial and municipal authorities; the cultural group, which included the university chancellors and directors of national cultural institutions; the professional group, which brought together the heads of national professional associations such as the College of Architects and the Chambers of Commerce; the administration group, formed by the cabinet ministers, the chairmen of the advisory bodies such as the Council of the Realm, and the head of the Supreme Tribunal; and the group directly appointed by the Chief of State ("Ley Constitutiva de las Cortes": Article 2). Except for the professional group, which chose its own members, and after 1967 the representatives of the family, which were voted in non-competitive local elections, Franco appointed all deputies (labeled procuradores) to the Cortes either directly, such as in the cases of the administration, political, and selected group, or indirectly, as with the union and cultural groups (Giménez Martínez 2012b: 255; 2014: 262-63). Thus, the Cortes replicated on a larger scale the nature of the Council of Ministers: an arena for consultation with the regime's "political families" that was under complete control of the dictator.

This tight control over the makeup of the Cortes was reinforced by the monopoly of agenda power exercised by the Executive. Although the Cortes were due to intervene in budgetary, economic, tax, banking, citizenship, civil rights, education, judicial organization, municipal and state administration matters, in fact they only debated the legislation that the government decided to send its way. This contingent intervention in lawmaking was the consequence of Franco's prerogative – established in the 1938 and 1939 state administration laws – to legislate unilaterally by issuing decree-laws on self-defined "matters of urgency" (Giménez Martínez 2012a; Payne and Palacios 2014: 462 et seq.). The dictator was therefore the main agenda setter.

Once the Cortes received a bill, the President referred it to one of its specialized committees, which were tasked with issuing a report to be voted in the Pleno. The number of committees, staffed by a minimum of 40 and a maximum of 60 Procuradores, ranged from 12 to 15 in the 1943-1967 period and their thematic jurisdictions tended to reflect the organization of the National Ministries(Giménez Martínez 2012b). If a bill dealt with more than one topic, the president set up an ad hoc mixed committee, which contrasted
with the much more extended option of referring such bills to more than one commission (which was, in fact, the case with the CAL).

The “Cortes Law” granted legislative initiative to deputies, but they could only exercise it by obtaining support from fifty deputies, or fifteen within the same committee, and subsequently persuading the president of the Cortes to include their proposal in the plenary agenda (Giménez Martínez 2012b: 226). The fulfillment of these requirements was highly unlikely given the facts that the Executive appointed the president, vicepresidents, and secretaries that made up the Cortes directorship (“Ley Constitutiva”: Article 7), and that the internal regulations of the Cortes centralized agenda power in the presidency. The Cortes president was empowered to organize and disband committees, assign deputies to committees, appoint their chairmen, establish deadlines for committee reports, return to committees any report deemed unsatisfactory, call for plenary sessions of the Cortes, set the agenda in the Cortes plenary, steer debates within the plenary, and coordinate work on any bill deemed of interest (Giménez Martínez 2012a: 258-59; 2014: 274; 2015: 88). This centralized agenda power was reinforced by two factors. One was the regulation of plenary sessions, which not only granted the presidency extensive powers to control their denouement – such as the authority to make and break the list of speakers, to appoint reporters for each bill, as well as to decide whether bills would be voted on by general assent or roll call – but also actually banned debate among the deputies, who were only allowed to address the chamber about proposed amendments to or rejections of bills if they had previously obtained support from at least ten committee members (Giménez Martínez 2012b: 260-61). The other factor was the continuity of loyal personnel: the presidency of the Cortes was held for twenty-two years by the same man who had designed the institution, the traditionalist Esteban Bilbao, under whose tenure the Cortes – according to Franco's cousin and military adjutant – ”said nothing but what the government wanted" (Franco Salgado-Araujo 1976: 99).

The role of the Cortes in Franco's regime was thus consistent with the structure of the dictatorship's power-sharing arrangement. In a regime where the authoritarian ruler could make law on his own at his convenience and was only willing to consult, rather than elaborate, his decisions with his support coalition, crafting the legislature as a “chamber of resonance” (Giménez Martínez 2012a: 269), rather than a lawmaking assembly, was a
coherent institutional design. The *Cortes* were therefore a notary legislature that served at the pleasure of a personal dictator.

In contrast, the power-sharing arrangement established by Argentina’s collective executive resulted in the constitution of a reviser legislature that was frequently at odds with that very same executive. The Legislative Advisory Commission consisted of nine senior officers of the Armed Forces – three per service – appointed by the High Commands of each Force for as long as Commanders pleased (“*Reglamento para el Funcionamiento de la Junta Militar, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional y Comisión de Asesoramiento Legislativo*”: Article 3.1 and 3.5.1). These officers met in plenary sessions to provide the Junta and the President "legislative advice on behalf of the Armed Forces” (“*Reglamento*”: Articles 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). Below the plenary were eight sub-commissions (Defense and Foreign Relations; Interior and Justice; Education; Social Welfare and Labor; Budget, Finance, Industry and Natural Resources; Agriculture, Livestock and Trade; Public Works and Transportation; Energy and Communications) staffed by four to six junior officers, with each service controlling the majority vote in three sub-commissions (CAL Archive, Air Force Library). The presidency of the CAL was also a shared position: its control was rotated on annual basis amongst the Armed Forces and, as a result, it was only controlled by the same force that controlled the nation's Presidency in 1978, 1981 and between July and September of 1982 when the other services temporary left the government. The makeup of the CAL thus tried to replicate the balance of power institutionalized in the Junta. Consequently, although CAL members could be replaced at the pleasure of their service's High Command, since the latter was not necessarily cohesive but – particularly in the case of the Army – factionalized, for the Commander sitting in the Junta purging the Force's delegation at the CAL could upset the balance of power in the High Command, which in turn could jeopardize the Commander's control over his own succession and, thus, the balance of power within the Junta. This overlapping factional politics provided the CAL delegates the chance to behave autonomously from the President by playing their two principals – the Junta and the High Commands – against one another.

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1 We thank Mariano Villalba for providing us with this information available at the Air Force Library.
The combination of the latter institutional environment and the regime's lawmaking procedures provided the CAL with incentives, resources, and opportunities to operate beyond the role of a merely consultative body. In stark contrast to the Spanish Cortes, the CAL was not contingently but, according to the regime's constitutional rules, necessarily required to "intervene in the formation and sanction of the nation's laws" (“Reglamento”: Article 3.3.1). To perform this role, the commission had to analyze all legislative initiatives with the aim to sort out those with “significant relevance” (SR), which it subsequently referred to its sub-commissions for further consideration, and send those "without significant relevance" (NSR) to the President for immediate approval (“Reglamento”: Article 4.2). The sub-commissions had 20 to 30 days to issue provisional reports on SR initiatives which had to suggest their approval, rejection or amendment “Reglamento”: Article 4.4). Subsequently, the CAL plenary had another 30 to 40 days to produce – using majority rule – a definitive report on each bill, which would then be referred to the President (“Reglamento”: Articles 4.5 and 4.6). Should the President disagree with the CAL’s report, the matter would be passed on to the Junta, whose decision would be final (“Reglamento”: Articles 4.8 and 4.9). The Proceso's rules did not grant the President or the Junta any sort of legislative decree power, so all bills had to be debated, and could be amended, by the CAL.

The Argentine regime's rules granted legislative proposal power to the High Commands of the Armed Forces, the President and the cabinet ministers (“Reglamento”: Articles 4.1.1 and 4.1.2), and even split veto power between the President and the Junta (“Reglamento”: Articles 4.8 and 4.9). These provisions aimed at guaranteeing that the Armed Forces and their factions would share responsibility for legislative decisions and have opportunity to voice their own concerns during the lawmaking process. However, these rules also conferred veto power to the military leaders and generalized the opportunities for them to use it. The rules of the legislative process, as Palazzo and Schinelli (1976: 56) aptly note, did not prevent the CAL's plenary from referring initiatives back to the sub-commissions whenever it disagreed with their provisional report. Since the CAL replicated the tripartite division of power established in the Junta, no single service or faction could make legislative decisions alone, the commission and its sub-commissions were venues for other institutional arenas – such as provincial governments – to channel their legislative demands, and the lawmaking process could
only reach an outcome by forming coalitions and forging agreements amongst the services and their factions.

The institutional design of the legislatures in these authoritarian regimes yields, again, three theoretically relevant implications for our argument. First, while in Franco's regime legislative power was concentrated in the Executive and only involved the Cortes in a contingent and non-binding way, legislative power in Argentina's last military regime was divided and shared between the Junta, the President, and the CAL: whereas Franco could enact virtually any legislation by decree and was not bound by any decision the Cortes could potentially make on any subject, in Argentina neither the Junta nor the President or the CAL could make legally-binding decisions alone.

Second, while in Franco's regime disagreement between the Executive and the Cortes was virtually impossible, in the Argentine Proceso disagreement between the CAL and the President was likely to be frequent: whereas the overwhelming majority of the Cortes members were appointed and could be removed directly or indirectly by Franco, and there were no constitutional rules by which the Cortes could oppose or override the Caudillo's decision, in Argentina the CAL members were autonomous from the President and could use factional divisions to play their principals in the Junta and the High Commands against each other, the President had no unilateral power to overrule the CAL, no single Junta member could unilaterally settle disputes between the CAL and the President, and given the tripartite division of power in all institutional arenas, the Junta was unlikely to form a majority to override the CAL.

Finally, while in the Franco regime the Executive monopolized agenda power, in the Argentine regime agenda power in the CAL was decentralized following informational principles: while Franco set the agenda by unilaterally deciding whether any initiative would be passed by decree or sent to the Cortes as a bill, and organized the legislature so as to centralize agenda setting in the presidency that decided the composition of committees, their agenda and the rules of floor debate and voting, in Argentina both the CAL and its sub-commissions were staffed by officers from all military services, so no self-selection or hegemony of preference outliers was possible; deliberations were conducted under open rule, so any amendment could be proposed and adopted; the plenary could discharge any sub-commission from considering any report, so no horse-
trading between both arenas or among sub-commissions was possible; the tripartite makeup of the plenary made the emergence of a legislative cartel unlikely. In short, while the institutional design of the Franco regime produced a notary legislature whose members were largely appointed by the dictator and invariably served his will, the Argentine regime's legislative institutions produced a reviser legislature constituted by significantly autonomous members who could only make decisions by forming inter-service and/or inter-faction coalitions.

*Istitutional design and lawmaking process*

What were the effects of these differences in institutional design on legislative performance? The preceding analysis of authoritarian institutions in Spain and Argentina suggests two hypotheses to be tested. One concerns the potential effects of the Executive's structure on lawmaking processes and outputs. If the Executive is structured as a series of advisory bodies that cater to the will of one person, it is likely that legislative proposals will virtually always be approved by the legislature, whereas if the Executive is structured as a collective intended to contain highly factionalized groups, it is likely that the legislative proposals submitted by members of one faction were blocked in the legislature by members of other factions. Thus,

Hypothesis 1: The more/less collective the Executive structure, the more/less likely that legislative proposals were blocked.

The second and third hypotheses concern the potential effects of legislative organization on lawmaking processes and outcomes. Given the monopolistic agenda power enjoyed by the Executive in the Franco regime, the largely appointed nature of the Cortes membership, and the centralized agenda setting power enjoyed by its presidency, and the stark contrast with the tripartite makeup of the Argentine CAL's plenary and sub-commissions, and the tripartite distribution of majority control by each Armed Force over the latter, it is likely that the Cortes met less frequently, had a smaller workload, and introduced less amendments to legislative proposals than the CAL. This is expected to be the case even though other factor, such as seniority rates (Miquel and Snyder 2006; O'Neill 2010), could affect the productivity of the legislature. Thus,
Hypothesis 2: The more/less concentrated the agenda power, the smaller/larger the frequency of meetings and the workload of the legislature.

Hypothesis 3: The more/less concentrated the agenda power and the larger/smaller dependency of the legislature's members on the Executive, the less/more likely the introduction of amendments to legislative initiatives.

To test these hypotheses we resort to archival evidence on the composition, activities, and outcomes of the Spanish Cortes between 1942 and 1967, and the Argentine Legislative Advisory Commission between 1976 and 1983. Following previous historical studies (for example Giménez Martínez 2012a) we restrict our analysis of the Cortes to the first eight legislatures because the 1967 electoral reform formally altered its nature from an appointed to a partially elected legislature – as classified in the PIPE dataset (Przeworski, Adam et al. 2013). Since the CAL was also an appointed body (even though it is generally characterized as consultative and does not even appear in databases of legislatures in authoritarian regimes), maintaining strict comparability on this dimension allows us to maximize variation in the other independent variables. Still, lawmaking patterns and outcomes in the Cortes were virtually unaltered after 1967, so the findings below should also apply to the period from 1967 to their demise.

The independent variables in our analysis are the structure of the Executive, the type of agenda power, and the legislator appointment procedures. The structure of the Executive, as defined above, can be personal, as is the case in Franco's regime, or collective, as is the case in the Argentine dictatorship. The type of agenda power can be centralized if it monopolizes legislative initiative in the Executive and concentrates agenda setting in the directorship of the legislature, as in the Spanish Cortes, or decentralized if it establishes shared power of initiative and distributes agenda setting capabilities to all factions, is in the Argentine CAL. The legislator appointment procedures can be concentrated if centralized by the Chief Executive/Chief of State, as occurred under Franco, or dispersed if it is allocated to the diverse factions that make up the collective Executive, as occurred under the Argentine Proceso.

The dependent variables change across hypotheses. To test Hypothesis 1, we compare rejection rates in both legislatures. We define rejection rate as the percentage of submitted
bills that were rejected, returned to or withdrawn by the Executive. To test Hypothesis 2, we compare the number of meetings and the number of bills handled per year held by each legislature. To test Hypothesis 3, we compare amendment activity in the Cortes and the CAL looking into amendment rates and cases. We define amendment rate as the percentage of all bills submitted to the legislature by the Executive that were amended by legislators, regardless of the final outcome of the lawmaking process.

4. Lawmaking under Authoritarianism: Institutional Design and Legislative Outcomes in Spain and Argentina.

According to Hypothesis 1, the theoretical expectation is that a legislative body in an authoritarian regime dominated by a personal Executive would hardly ever reject its legislative proposals. This was in fact the case with the Franco regime where “never in the Cortes’ history a single vote against the Cabinet took place” (Giménez Martínez 2015: 84- authors’ own translation). This contrasts sharply with what happened with the Cortes’ members legislative proposals: only four of those proposals received a positive vote in the plenary in their first 24 years of activity (Giménez Martínez 2012b: 226).

In contrast, during the eight years in which the CAL was active, 18% of the Executive’s legislative proposals was flatly rejected by the Commission, returned to the Executive or withdrawn by it, while 23% was not enacted. As can be observed in Table 1 there was some variation in the rejection rate through time. However, even at its lowest point (8.5%) it continues to be significant compared both to the Cortes as with other authoritarian legislatures (Saiegh 2011).

Table 1- Legislative Proposals CAL per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>N Proposals</th>
<th>Rejection Rate</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Returned/Withdrawn</th>
<th>Amended</th>
<th>Not Enacted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference between the 18% rejection rate and the 23% not enacted proposals arises from three main causes: a percentage of proposals which were not enacted due to time limitations (this is clearly the case in 1983 and explains the greater divergence in both figures for that year), proposals which the President or the Junta finally decided not to pass regardless of the CAL recommendation, and a small percentage of proposals for which the CAL plenary did not issue a final recommendation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Meetings</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of CAL Meetings</th>
<th>% of Cortes Pleno Meetings</th>
<th>% of Committees Meetings</th>
<th>% of Calderón Archivo Meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2150</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ own elaboration from CAL archives

The theoretical expectation from Hypothesis 2 is that the degree to which agenda power is concentrated will affect the frequency of meetings and the workload of the legislature. As stated in the previous section, in the Spanish case agenda power was *de facto* concentrated in a personal Executive, and shared by different factions, in the Argentinean experience. This had a clear impact in both the frequency of plenary meetings and the overall workload of the legislature. The *Cortes’ Pleno* was supposed to meet and decide on the approval of committee reports at least twice a year and any time the president called for it (Gómez de la Serna 1971: 103). In fact, it met a maximum of ten times a year in 1971 and a minimum of 3 in 1958 (Giménez Martínez 2015: 91). On the contrary, the CAL plenary met much more frequently. Despite the fact that there are no records of the number of meetings, it is possible to identify those plenary meetings in which reports were issued. Even though this measure can underestimate the actual number of meetings, it indicates that the CAL plenary met at least 778 times, which amounts to an average of more than 97 meetings per year.

A similar pattern can be identified regarding the overall workload. The committees at the Spanish *Cortes* received a total of 4415 legislative proposals for examination during their first 24 years, roughly 184 proposals per year, with a minimum of 101 in 1956 and a maximum of 289 in 1963. In turn, the CAL received 2150 in its eight years of activity, almost 269 per year, with a minimum of 193 in 1982 and a maximum of 338 the following year. Furthermore, out of the 4415 reports issued by the *Cortes’* committees, only 340 (8%) were voted in a plenary session (Giménez Martínez 2012b: 235) while the CAL plenary treated every single report issued by its sub-commissions.

The workload and meeting frequency in the CAL was such even though its members were much less experienced as legislators than the *Cortes’ Procuradores*. None of the military representatives at the CAL had any previous political experience, and they
only served for less than two years on average (1.9 with a standard deviation of 1.2). In contrast, some of the Procuradores did have previous experience, and served for more than six years on average. Moreover, some deputies remained in the legislature for the whole 24 year-period.

Finally, the theoretical expectation from Hypothesis 3 is that the degree of concentration of agenda power and dominance over the members of the legislature have an inverse relationship to the probability of introducing amendments to legislative initiatives. Unfortunately, there is no systematic evidence of the amendments introduced by the Cortes. However, the little evidence found in secondary sources indicates that this was not an extended feature. In fact, the introduction of amends in the plenary sessions was regarded as an "heroic deed" which received ample media coverage (Giménez Martínez 2012b: 203). On the contrary, the CAL was quite likely to amend the proposals it received. As can be readily observed in Table 1, CAL members introduced amendments to 26% of bills. This figure is even higher (65%) if we only consider those proposals classified as Significantly Relevant and, thus, sent to the sub-commissions for further analysis (Table 2). Not only are this figures substantively significant for an authoritarian government but there is also evidence that at least some of the amendments introduced had important policy effects (Bonvecchi and Simison 2015).
Table 2- Amended proposals, bills classified as Significantly Relevant only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ own elaboration from CAL archives

5. Conclusion

In 1971, the Cortes’ attorney wrote that this legislature was the “higher body of participation of the Spanish people in the affairs of state” and it had evolved from a consultative assembly “for the mere preparation and elaboration of the laws” into a “clearly legislative Chamber” (Gómez de la Serna 1971: 85, authors' own translation). Conversely, the first CAL president, Vice Admiral Antonio S. Vañek, declared to the media in 1976 that the CAL was “a military body which does not replace the Parliament”. Likewise, an article published the day before in La Opinión stated that “the advisory commission would not, in any way, and despite its collective nature, act as a Legislative Power, because the authority to legislate that the National Constitution gives to Congress, would be exercised by the President of the Nation and the Commanders’ Junta, in accordance with the Statute of the National Reorganization Process”.

However, the evidence on the overall performance of both legislative bodies presented above suggests a radically different reality. As Giménez Martínez (2015: 69, authors' own translation) states, the Cortes “were not a parliamentary assembly” but “a body for the representation of the ruling class which did not exclusively legislate, nor efficiently controlled governmental action”. In fact, its members intervened only in a share of governmental action, could hardly make use of the legislative initiative granted to them by the Cortes Law (“Ley Constitutiva”), did not reject a single Executive proposal
and introduced only a few amendments. This stands in stark contrast to the CAL’s performance. Its members took part in the legislative process of all the laws enacted by the Executive after its inception, rejecting 18% and amending 26% of the received proposals.

The institutional analysis and empirical evidence provided in the previous sections supports our theoretical claim that the explanation for this apparent contradiction lies in the institutional design of both authoritarian governments, particularly in the contrasting structures of the Executive and the organization of the legislative process. In the Spanish case, a personalized Executive with monopolistic agenda power, the largely appointed nature of the Cortes membership, and the centralized agenda setting power enjoyed by its presidency precluded the Cortes from having a significant policy influence. Whereas in the Argentinean case, a collective Executive intended to contain highly factionalized groups, the decentralized agenda power, the tripartite makeup of the plenary and sub-commissions, and the tripartite distribution of majority control by each Armed Force over the latter, paved the way for the CAL to play a significant role in the policy making process. This comparison suggests that legislatures in authoritarian regimes can indeed be consequential for lawmaking when the power-sharing arrangements within which they are incepted establish collective Executives that require lawmaking processes apt to enable different factions to revise and amend legislative initiatives.

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